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2009/11/14 UN Security Council Resolution 1874, North KoreaThe UN Security Council passed this draft resolution regarding North Korea on June 12, 2009. Resolution 1874 (2009) The Security Council, Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as Expressing the gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic
including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at that time in light of the DPRK’s compliance with relevant provisions of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution;
2009/6/19 US destroyer on course to search suspected North Korean arms shipUS destroyer on course to search suspected North Korean arms ship
Tension was growing in the Pacific today as the US navy prepared to intercept a North Korean cargo ship suspected of carrying weapons in defiance of a United Nations ban. The US navy has been tracking the Kang Nam since it left a North Korean port on Wednesday. It would be the first ship to be intercepted since the UN last week imposed sanctions on North Korea as punishment for conducting an underground nuclear test last month. The sanctions ban the import and export of nuclear material, missiles and all other weapons other than small arms. A destroyer, the USS John McCain (named after the father of the Republican senator and failed presidential candidate, who was an admiral), was awaiting orders to intercept the ship off the Chinese coast. The UN sanctions allow the US to hail a North Korean ship and demand to be allowed to conduct a search, but not to forcibly board it. North Korea has said a forcible search would be regarded as an act of war. Reflecting heightened tension, the US yesterday began moving radar systems and ground-to-air missiles to Hawaii. The Pentagon said it fears Pyongyang could test-fire an intercontinental missile in the direction of Hawaii over the next few weeks in retaliation for the UN sanctions. US officials designated the Kang Nam as being of "special interest" soon after it left port. If the North Koreans refuse to allow a US crew to search the ship, the US could order it into the nearest port. Failing that, the John McCain could closely follow the ship until it reaches port. The US would then be entitled to demand, under the UN sanctions agreement, that that country inspect the ship. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, told reporters at the Pentagon: "Without going into specific details, clearly we intend to vigorously enforce the UN security council resolution." Republicans, including John McCain, have criticised the UN resolution for being too weak because it does not make such searches at sea mandatory. McCain on Tuesday described interceptions without mandatory searches as "a half measure" and called for a tougher response. "Those ships should be stopped and searched if there is probable cause," he said. But Mullen said the US would first try "hail and query" and if that failed, direct the ship to a port where the country would be required to inspect the vessel. He refused to confirm that the Kang Nam was the ship being tracked or to say what the ship might be carrying. Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, sitting alongside Mullen, told reporters he was taking seriously the possibility of a North Korean missile launch in the direction of the US. "We're obviously watching the situation in the North, with respect to missile launches, very closely," he said. "And we do have some concerns, if they were to launch a missile to the east, in the direction of Hawaii." Gates has ordered the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles to the islands. The THAAD (Theatre High-Altitude Area Defence) missiles do not carry warheads but are intended to collide with incoming missiles. He has also directed that an array of floating radars be positioned round Hawaii, to track incoming missiles. "So, without telegraphing what we will do, I would just say, we are – I think we are – in a good position, should it become necessary to protect American territory," Gates said. In contrast with Iran and other foreign policy hotspots where the Obama administration is pursuing a softly-softly approach, it is toughening its position towards North Korea, frustrated that Pyongyang rebuffed diplomatic overtures and incentives offered by the Bush administration. Washington wants Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table to discuss the decommissioning of facilities aimed at creating nuclear weapons. 2009/4/6 Intel launches new chip logos, rating systemIntel has revamped its processor badging and rating system. Consumers are the main target, though business systems will get new badging too. The new badges include a die (the chip minus the packaging) accent in the upper right hand corner, a prominent main brand (e.g., "Core"), and the modifier (e.g., "i7"). Intel has also instituted a star system that rates chips from five stars (best performance in class) to one star (lowest performance). "So when a consumer goes into a Best Buy store they can distinguish between Centrino, Core, Celeron, Core 2 Duo, Core 2 Quad," said Intel spokesman Bill Calder. That may be a little easier said than done, however. Some consumers (but not including "tech savvy" Giampaolo, of course) will still need help from the sales person to decipher the badging. A daunting challenge in the case of consumer laptops, which are typically plastered with a hodgepodge of stickers from Intel, Nvidia, Advanced Micro Devices, AMD's ATI graphics chip unit, and other companies. Intel is in the process of moving to a "pretty aggressive brand simplification plan," Calder said. "When we launched Core i7, we said we're moving to a single primary client brand, which is Core. We're moving in that direction," he said. The Atom processor will not get a modifier. In the future, the Nehalem server processor, currently branded only as "Xeon" with a letter and number suffix, may also get new branding to make it more readily identifiable as part of the Nehalem architecture like its desktop sibling the Core i7, Calder said.
2009/4/2 Language Proficiency Assessment Codes
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| Level | Speaking | Listening | Reading |
| 0 |
No Proficiency: Unable to function in the spoken language |
No Proficiency: No practical understanding of the spoken language. |
No Proficiency: No practical ability to read the language. |
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0+
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Memorized Proficiency: Able to satisfy immediate needs using rehearsed utterances.
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Memorized Proficiency: Sufficient comprehension to understand a number of memorized utterances in areas of immediate needs. |
Memorized Proficiency: Can recognize all the letters in the printed version of an alphabetic system and high- frequency elements of a syllabary or a character system. |
| 1 | Elementary Proficiency: Able to satisfy minimum courtesy requirements and maintain very simple face-to-face conversations on familiar topics. | Elementary Proficiency: Sufficient comprehension to understand utterances about basic survival needs and minimum courtesy and travel requirements. | Elementary Proficiency: Sufficient comprehension to read very simple connected written material in a form equivalent to usual printing or typescript.< |
| 1+ | Elementary Proficiency, Plus: Can initiate and maintain predictable face-to-face conversations and satisfy limited social demands | Elementary Proficiency, Plus: Sufficient comprehension to understand short conversations about all survival needs and limited social demands | Elementary Proficiency, Plus: Sufficient comprehension to understand simple discourse in printed form for informative social purposes. |
| 2 | Limited Working Proficiency: Able to satisfy routine social demands and limited work requirements. | Limited Working Proficiency: Sufficient comprehension to understand conversations on routine social demands and limited job requirements. | Limited Working Proficiency: Sufficient comprehension to read simple, authentic written material in a form equivalent to usual printing or typescript on subjects within a familiar context. |
| 2+ | Limited Working Proficiency, Plus: Able to satisfy most work requirements with language usage that is often, but not always, acceptable and effective. | Limited Working Proficiency, Plus: Sufficient comprehension to understand most routine social demands and most conversations on work requirements as well as some discussions on concrete topics related to particular interests and special fields of competence. | Limited Working Proficiency, Plus: Sufficient comprehension to understand most factual material in non-technical prose as well as some discussions on concrete topics related to special professional interests. |
| 3 | General Professional Proficiency: Able to speak the language with sufficient structural accuracy and vocabulary to participate effectively in most formal and informal conversations on practical, social, and professional topics. | General Professional Proficiency: Able to understand the essentials of all speech in a standard dialect including technical discussions within a special field. | General Professional Proficiency: Able to read within a normal range of speed and with almost complete comprehension a variety of authentic prose material on unfamiliar subjects. |
| 3+ | General Professional Proficiency, Plus: Is often able to use the language to satisfy professional needs in a wide range of sophisticated and demanding tasks. | General Professional Proficiency, Plus: Comprehends most of the content and intent of a variety of forms and styles of speech pertinent to professional needs, as well as general topics and social conversations. | General Professional Proficiency, Plus: Can comprehend a variety of styles and forms pertinent to professional needs. |
| 4 | Advanced Professional Proficiency: Able to use to the language fluently and accurately on all levels normally pertinent to professional needs. | Advanced Professional Proficiency: Able to understand all forms and styles of speech pertinent to professional needs. | Advanced Professional Proficiency: Able to read fluently and accurately all styles and forms of the language pertinent to professional needs. |
| 4+ | Advanced Professional Proficiency, Plus: Speaking proficiency is regularly superior in all respects, usually equivalent to that of a well-educated, highly articulate native speaker. | Advanced Professional Proficiency, Plus: Increased ability to understand extremely difficult and abstract speech as well as ability to understand all forms of speech pertinent to professional needs, including social conversations. | Advanced Professional Proficiency, Plus: Nearly native ability to read and understand extremely difficult or abstract prose, a very wide variety of vocabulary, idioms, colloquialisms, and slang. |
| 5 | Functionally Native Proficiency: Speaking proficiency is functionally equivalent to that of a highly articulate, well-educated native speaker and reflects the cultural standards of the country where the language is natively spoken. | Functionally Native Proficiency: Comprehension equivalent to that of a the educated native listener. | Functionally Native Proficiency: Reading proficiency is functionally equivalent to that of the well-educated native reader. |
Let’s open a can of worms and make this week interesting, shall we? Is e-mail and Web use monitoring good or bad in a government work place? I bring this topic up because I just read an article that quoted a recent survey in CSO magazine that said that 61% of survey respondents allow e-mail content monitoring while 75% allowed monitoring of Web use.
This made me wonder about government use of employee monitoring. My guess is the percentages would vary depending on the organization’s mission and amount of regulation that they must work under. For instance, the Department of Defense and the CIA probably do more monitoring than a local government, for instance. But before we get into who is monitoring and why, let’s talk about the basics of monitoring.
Monitoring can be defined as storage and review of employee e-mail, files, and computer activity. By default we engage in the first part of the definition through our normal IT activities. E-mail and files are regularly backed up for recovery purposes and network activities, such as login and logout times, are often part of log files kept by the network operating system. Our Web activity record is kept by default in the form of history files, cookies, cache, and logs on servers, as well as on the clients themselves.
The key then to "do we monitor" is review. Do we allow the review of e-mail, files or Web use in our organization? I am willing to bet that most of you reading this will say yes to that question. In fact, I am pretty sure that there are extremely few government organizations that would disallow the examination of computer records and e-mail as part of an investigation into harassment, theft, or other conduct not permitted by the organization. Therefore, the majority of us participate in monitoring at the lowest level.
But when most of us hear the term monitoring, we aren’t thinking about the passive, low-level monitoring described above. Most of us think about active monitoring tools and active/purposeful review of information collected by those tools.
From keystroke loggers to e-mail and Web filtering/blocking, there is a tool made that we can employ to record/stop the activity. The question then becomes – should we?
Proponents of active monitoring usually give the following arguments for doing so:
Detractors of the practice usually give the following arguments:
First and foremost, the answer to "should we?" should not come from IT. This is strictly a management and HR decision and the decision to monitor or not and to what degree has to come from them. That’s not to say that IT should not play a leadership role in bringing the issue to management’s attention – after all, the tools and capabilities do reside with IT.
In fact, IT must play a strong role in making sure that those who will be making the decisions understand not only the capabilities regarding employee monitoring but also understand the drawbacks. It is with this information that management can weigh all the pros and cons associated with the issue and choose the course that is best for the organization.
No matter what level of monitoring is used, (remember I argued earlier that we all participate in monitoring) the policy should be disclosed very clearly. Make sure your acceptable use policy defines what a violation is and what the consequences are of violating the policy.
Personally, I have always been a big believer of blocking certain types of activities. I think it is in the best interest of the organization and its employees to protect the workers from themselves (to a certain degree.) For example, I would rather proactively block pornography and hate material rather than check up on people, or deal with the results of complaints that might arise from inappropriate use.
Secondly, given open records laws, the more you retain regarding employee behavior, the more fodder there is for unwarranted ill will. For example; if you log Web site activity for the organization and you allow "casual surfing of the internet during lunch and breaks," you will likely find that non-work related Internet activity comprises a large percentage of total Web activity. It won’t matter when and how the activity occurred to the citizenry when they read a headline screaming "Government Employees spend majority of time on eBay!" Think about that when factoring in the pros and cons of monitoring.
SUBJECT: Designation and Sharing of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)
Purpose
(1) This memorandum (a) adopts, defines, and institutes "Controlled Unclassified Information" (CUI) as the single, categorical designation henceforth throughout the executive branch for all information within the scope of that definition, which includes most information heretofore referred to as "Sensitive But Unclassified" (SBU) in the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), and (b) establishes a corresponding new CUI Framework for designating, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating information designated as CUI. The memorandum's purpose is to standardize practices and thereby improve the sharing of information, not to classify or declassify new or additional information.
Background – The Current SBU Environment
(2) The global nature of the threats facing the United States requires that (a) our Nation's entire network of defenders be able to share information more rapidly so those who must act have the information they need, and (b) the United States Government protect sensitive information, information privacy, and other legal rights of Americans. A uniform and more standardized governmentwide framework for what has previously been known as SBU information is essential for the ISE to succeed. Accordingly, this memorandum establishes a standardized framework designed to facilitate and enhance the sharing of Controlled Unclassified Information.
Definitions
(3) In this memorandum, the following terms have the meaning indicated:
a. "Controlled Unclassified Information" is a categorical designation that refers to unclassified information that does not meet the standards for National Security Classification under Executive Order 12958, as amended, but is (i) pertinent to the national interests of the United States or to the important interests of entities outside the Federal Government, and (ii) under law or policy requires protection from unauthorized disclosure, special handling safeguards, or prescribed limits on exchange or dissemination. Henceforth, the designation CUI replaces "Sensitive But Unclassified" (SBU).
b. "CUI Council" is a subcommittee of the Information Sharing Council (ISC), created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) (IRTPA).
c. "CUI Framework" refers to the single set of policies and procedures governing the designation, marking, safeguarding, and dissemination of CUI terrorism-related information that originates in departments and agencies, regardless of the medium used for the display, storage, or transmittal of such information.
d. "CUI Framework Standards Registry" (the "CUI Registry") refers to the official list of, and recognized standards for, CUI markings including "safeguarding," and "dissemination" maintained by the Executive Agent.
e. "Departments and Agencies" means executive agencies as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code; the United States Postal Service; but not the Government Accountability Office.
f. "Enhanced Safeguarding" is a handling requirement that means the information so designated is subject to measures more stringent than those normally required because inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure would create a risk of substantial harm. This requirement is indicated by the marking "Controlled Enhanced."
g. "Executive Agent" means the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
h. "Information" means any communicable knowledge or documentary material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is owned by, is produced by or for, or is under the control of the Federal Government.
i. "Information Sharing Environment" means an approach that facilitates the sharing of "terrorism information," as defined by section 1016 of IRTPA.
j. "Safeguarding" means measures and controls that are prescribed to protect controlled unclassified information.
k. "Sensitive But Unclassified" refers collectively to the various designations used heretofore within the Federal Government for documents and information that are sufficiently sensitive to warrant some level of protection from disclosure but that do not warrant classification.
l. "Specified Dissemination" is a handling instruction that means the information so designated is subject to additional instructions governing the extent to which dissemination is permitted.
m. "Standard Dissemination" is a handling instruction that means dissemination is authorized to the extent it is reasonably believed that dissemination would further the execution of lawful or official mission purpose, provided that individuals disseminating this information do so within the scope of their assigned duties.
n. "Standard Safeguarding" is a handling requirement that means the information so designated is subject to baseline safeguarding measures that reduce the risks of unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure. This requirement shall be indicated through the use of the marking "Controlled."
o. "Terrorism-Related Information" means (i) information, as defined by Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Public Law 110-53, section 504; (ii) homeland security information, as defined by 6 U.S.C. 482(f); and (iii) law enforcement information relating to terrorism.
Policy – The CUI Framework
(4) The uniform use of CUI is essential to fostering an effective ISE. All departments and agencies shall apply the CUI Framework, which consists of the following policies and standards, as outlined in paragraphs 5-19 for the designation, marking, safeguarding, and dissemination of any CUI terrorism-related information within the ISE that originates in departments and agencies, regardless of the medium used for its display, storage, or transmittal.
(5) All CUI shall merit one of two levels of safeguarding procedures: standard (marked "Controlled") or enhanced (marked "Controlled Enhanced").
(6) All CUI shall merit one of two levels of dissemination controls: "Standard Dissemination" or "Specified Dissemination."
(7) All CUI shall be (a) categorized into one of three combinations of safeguarding procedures and dissemination controls, and (b) so indicated through the use of the following corresponding markings:
(i) "Controlled with Standard Dissemination" meaning the information requires standard safeguarding measures that reduce the risks of unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure. Dissemination is permitted to the extent that it is reasonably believed that it would further the execution of a lawful or official purpose.
(ii) "Controlled with Specified Dissemination" meaning the information requires safeguarding measures that reduce the risks of unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure. Material contains additional instructions on what dissemination is permitted.
(iii) "Controlled Enhanced with Specified Dissemination" meaning the information requires safeguarding measures more stringent than those normally required since the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure would create risk of substantial harm. Material contains additional instructions on what dissemination is permitted.
(8) Any additional CUI markings may be prescribed only by the Executive Agent. Use of additional CUI markings is prohibited unless the Executive Agent determines that extraordinary circumstances warrant the use of additional markings.
(9) Departments and agencies shall apply the CUI Registry's standards. The originator of CUI may not impose any additional safeguarding or dissemination requirements upon the recipient(s). No department or agency shall create CUI categories or rules outside the CUI Framework.
(10) Recipients of CUI shall report any unauthorized or inadvertent disclosures to the designating agency.
(11) All CUI shall be marked in a clear manner and conform to statutory and regulatory requirements, if any, regarding markings. Recipients of CUI that is not marked shall mark the information appropriately and inform the originator that it has been so marked.
(12) Wherever possible, it is expected that departments and agencies will re-mark archived or legacy material when it is incorporated into the ISE.
(13) CUI markings may inform but do not control the decision of whether to disclose or release the information to the public, such as in response to a request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
(14) Originating departments and agencies shall retain control of decisions regarding whether to disseminate CUI materials beyond their Standard or Specified Dissemination instructions, including any dissemination to the media or general public.
(15) Material that contains both CUI and non-CUI information, or that contains multiple categories of CUI, should be marked accordingly by portions such that those categorical distinctions are apparent.
(16) The CUI markings shall be incorporated into ISE-related information technology (IT) projects under development or developed in the future and shall be reflected in plans for new information technologies.
(17) The CUI markings shall be used regardless of the medium through which the information appears or conveys. Oral communications should be prefaced with a statement describing the controls when necessary to ensure that recipients are aware of the information's status.
(18) Departments or agencies shall not impose safeguarding requirements or dissemination controls on information in the ISE that is neither classified nor CUI.
(19) When a department or agency receives CUI originating from a State, local, tribal, private sector, or foreign partner, any nonfederal legacy markings shall be retained, unless the originator authorizes its removal.
(20) Implementation of the CUI Framework shall commence upon the date of this memorandum and shall be completed within 5 years.
CUI Framework Implementation
(21) The Executive Agent shall be responsible for overseeing and managing implementation of this CUI Framework.
(22) The Executive Agent shall have the following authorities and responsibilities:
a. Develop and issue CUI policy standards and implementation guidance consistent with this memorandum, including appropriate recommendations to State, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign partner entities for implementing the CUI Framework. As appropriate, establish new safeguarding and dissemination controls, and, upon a determination that extraordinary circumstances warrant the use of additional CUI markings, authorize the use of such additional markings;
b. Establish and chair the CUI Council;
c. Establish, approve, and maintain safeguarding standards and dissemination instructions, including "Specified Dissemination" requirements proposed by the heads of departments and agencies;
d. Publish the CUI safeguarding and dissemination standards in the CUI Registry;
e. Monitor department and agency compliance with CUI policy, standards, and markings;
f. Establish baseline training requirements and develop an ISE-wide CUI training program to be implemented by departments and agencies;
g. Provide appropriate information regarding the CUI Framework to the Congress, to State, local, tribal, and private sector entities, and to foreign partners;
h. Advise the heads of departments and agencies on the resolution by the CUI Council of complaints and disputes among such departments and agencies concerning the proper designation or marking of CUI; and
i. Establish, in consultation with affected departments and agencies, a process that addresses enforcement mechanisms and penalties for improper handling of CUI.
(23) A CUI Council is hereby established as a subcommittee of the ISC. Its members shall be drawn from the ISC's membership. The CUI Council shall:
a. Serve as the primary advisor to the Executive Agent on issues pertaining to the CUI Framework;
b. Advise the Executive Agent in developing procedures, guidelines, and standards necessary to establish, implement, and maintain the CUI Framework;
c. Ensure coordination among the departments and agencies participating in the CUI Framework;
d. Advise the Executive Agent on the resolution of complaints and disputes among departments and agencies about proper designation or marking of CUI; and
e. As appropriate, consult with the ISC's State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Subcommittee.
(24) The head of each department and agency with possession of terrorism-related information shall:
a. Ensure the implementation of the CUI Framework within such department or agency;
b. Promulgate guidance for the implementation of the CUI Framework within such department or agency, consistent with ISE-wide CUI policies issued by the CUI Executive Agent, as established in paragraph 21;
c. Adopt markings listed in the CUI Registry maintained by the Executive Agent as the exclusive CUI markings used by such department or agency, consistent with paragraphs 5-8 of this memorandum;
d. Propose any necessary "Specified Dissemination" instructions to the Executive Agent for approval and listing in the CUI Registry;
e. Designate an appropriately qualified senior official from within the department or agency as its representative on the CUI Council;
f. Implement a CUI training program for their respective department or agency, based on the ISE-wide training program established by the Executive Agent, and ensure all appropriate personnel (i) understand CUI policies and procedures, and (ii) can apply them when creating, disseminating, or safeguarding CUI material;
g. Establish a process that enables their respective department or agency to address noncompliance with the new CUI Framework within the agency, and ensure management and oversight issues or concerns can be elevated to the appropriate department or agency decision-makers;
h. Establish a process within their respective department or agency that, where appropriate, promptly raises to the Executive Agent matters of concern regarding the Framework; and
i. Ensure full implementation of the CUI Framework, consistent with policies, guidance, and standards established by the Executive Agent, within 5 years of the date of this memorandum.
Designating CUI
(25) Information shall be designated as CUI and carry an authorized CUI marking if:
a. a statute requires or authorizes such a designation; or
b. the head of the originating department or agency, through regulations, directives, or other specific guidance to the agency, determines that the information is CUI. Such determination should be based on mission requirements, business prudence, legal privilege, the protection of personal or commercial rights, safety, or security. Such department or agency directives, regulations, or guidance shall be provided to the Executive Agent for review.
(26) Notwithstanding the above, information shall not be designated as CUI:
a. to (i) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (ii) prevent embarrassment to the Federal Government or any Federal official, any organization, or agency; (iii) improperly or unlawfully interfere with competition in the private sector; or (iv) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require such protection;
b. if it is required to be made available to the public; or
c. if it has already been released to the public under proper authority.
Exceptions to CUI
(27) This memorandum requires that all CUI originated by departments and agencies and shared within the ISE shall conform to the policies and standards for the designating, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating established in accordance with this memorandum. However, infrastructure protection agreements not fully accommodated under the CUI Framework (and its associated markings, safeguarding requirements, and dissemination limitations) shall be considered exceptions to this CUI Framework. Infrastructure protection exceptions include and apply to information governed by or subject to the following regulations:
a. 6 CFR Pt. 29 – PCII (Protected Critical Infrastructure Information);
b. 49 CFR Pts. 15 (Department of Transportation) & 1520 (Department of Homeland Security/Transportation Security Administration) – SSI (Sensitive Security Information);
c. 6 CFR Pt. 27 – CVI (Chemical Vulnerability Information); and
d. 10 CFR Pt. 73 – SGI (Safeguards Information).
(28) The CUI Framework shall be used for such information to the maximum extent possible, but shall not affect or interfere with specific regulatory requirements for marking, safeguarding, and disseminating.
(29) The affected department or agency is authorized to select the most applicable CUI safeguarding marking for the regulation. Any additional requirements for the safeguarding beyond that specified under the CUI Framework shall be appropriately registered in the CUI Registry. Any regulatory marking shall follow the CUI marking, and a specified dissemination instruction shall articulate any additional regulatory requirements.
General Provisions
(30) This memorandum:
a. shall be implemented in a manner consistent with applicable law, including Federal laws protecting the information privacy rights and other legal rights of Americans, and subject to the availability of appropriations;
b. shall be implemented in a manner consistent with the statutory authority of the principal officers of departments and agencies as heads of their respective departments or agencies;
c. shall not be construed to impair or otherwise affect the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, and legislative proposals; and
d. is intended only to improve the internal management of the Federal Government and is not intended to, and does not, create any rights or benefits, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
GEORGE W. BUSH
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Armed Forces Farewell to the President of the United States (Arlington, VA)
As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Arlington, VA, Tuesday, January 06, 2009
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Thank you, Admiral Mullen. Some of you of a certain generation might remember a line from the John Wayne movie “Red River,” an epic story of a thousand-mile cattle drive across Texas. At one point, one of the characters says: “There’s three times in a man’s life when he has the [a] right to yell at the moon: when he marries, when his children come, and when he finishes a job he had to be crazy to start.” Well, before President Bush finishes this job, I’m pleased to have this chance – on behalf of the United States military – to pay tribute to our Commander in Chief and give him proper thanks. The legacy of George W. Bush in matters of war and peace began taking form more than a year before he first took the oath of office. In the fall of 1999, then-Governor Bush gave a speech at the Citadel titled “A Period of Consequences.” He observed that nearly a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military was still organized more for Cold War threats than for the challenges of a new century – what he called “an era of car bombers and plutonium merchants and cyber terrorists and drug cartels and unbalanced dictators – all the unconventional and invisible threats of new technologies and old hatreds.” On a bright Tuesday morning in September, eight months into President Bush’s first term, we learned how dangerous and unpredictable this new era could be, and saw in the starkest terms how necessary was the task of transforming the American defense establishment to meet these challenges. It was a task inspired by the vision of President Bush, propelled by the energetic advocacy of Secretary Rumsfeld, informed by the experience of our senior military leaders, and accelerated by the urgent demands of two unconventional ground wars. The result is an American military that has become more agile, lethal, and prepared to deal with the full spectrum of 21st century conflict – and, on a personal note, a force that is dramatically more deployable and expeditionary than when I last served in government 15 years ago. Consider just a few of the historic changes: • The Army has undergone its most significant restructuring in more than two generations, moving from a division-based to a modular brigade-based force; • The Navy’s Fleet Response Plan has nearly doubled the number of strike carrier groups that can be surged in the first weeks of a crisis; • America’s Special Forces have seen vast increases in budget, personnel, authorities – and most importantly, in capabilities – in the campaign against terrorism worldwide; • The number of unmanned aerial vehicles has grown some 40-fold to more than 6,000, and we have seen a genuine revolution in the military’s ability to fuse intelligence and operations; • Cold War basing arrangements in Germany, Korea, and Japan have been modernized and sized to better reflect the security requirements of this century; • New authorities and programs enable the military to build the capacity of allies and partners in cooperation with civilian agencies and organizations; • And much, much more. As this historic institutional shift was underway, President Bush led our military through two major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and a broader struggle against terrorist networks worldwide. He has not flinched when faced with difficult war-time decisions, including the momentous decision two years ago to send more troops into Iraq and revamp our strategy there. Nor has the President ever hidden from the human consequences of his decisions. We have seen this in countless visits with the wounded at Walter Reed, Bethesda, and other military hospitals. And there are the meetings that he and the First Lady have held with thousands of family members of wounded and fallen troops. The President’s deep regard and affection for our service members and their families has played out in ways big and small: surprise visits to Iraq and Afghanistan to shake hands and high-five, and personal phone calls to those deployed over Thanksgiving. And even the occasional chest bump to unwary cadets. Some might remember the story of Staff Sergeant Michael McNaughton of the Louisiana National Guard. In January 2003, he stepped on a land mine 30 miles north of Kabul and lost his right leg. President Bush visited Michael at Walter Reed and suggested they go for a run when he received his prosthetic. Months later Michael and the president jogged around the South Lawn of the White House together. A single promise to a single soldier. A small act that reflects President Bush’s commitment to care for and honor every member of the armed forces. Mr. President, every day these volunteers execute your orders with courage and determination – facing down danger for the greater good of America. On behalf of more than two million men and women in uniform, we are deeply grateful for your leadership and service to America in a time of war. Finally and personally, I would like to thank you for granting me the opportunity to serve as Secretary of Defense. It is true that I have been known to grouse from time to time about coming back to Washington, D.C. Yet working every day with our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines has been the greatest honor of my life and I will always owe you a debt of gratitude for that. I have appreciated your steadfast confidence and support over these past two years. I wish you and Laura the very best as you begin the next phase in your lives. Ladies and gentlemen, the President of the United States | |
TRABZON, Turkey: The women arrive here by ferry from across the Black Sea, sometimes dozens at a time. Whatever their real names, they are known in Turkey as Natashas, and often end up working as prostitutes in this country's growing sex trade, sometimes against their will.
Turkey, with its now booming economy and lax visa requirements, is becoming the world's largest market for Slavic women, one of the most visible exports of the former Soviet Union's struggling new states.
"Think of many rivers flowing into one sea," said Allan Freedman, who coordinates countertrafficking programs at the Ankara bureau of the International Organization for Migration, an independent body that works closely with the United Nations. "That sea is Turkey."
Most of the women come of their own free will but many end up as virtual slaves, sold from pimp to pimp through a loosely organized criminal network that stretches from Moscow to Istanbul and beyond.
Prostitution is legal in strictly secular Turkey where the government licenses brothels, known as "general houses," and issues prostitutes identity cards that give them rights to some free medical care and other social services. But women working in general houses - there is usually one in each large city - tend to be older, and the demand for young, slender women has outstripped supply as Turkey's economy has improved. Slavic women are meeting that need.
Women are recruited at home with the promise of employment," Freedman said. "But once they are across the border their passports are taken away and they are beaten and raped and forced into prostitution." The women are typically kept locked in an apartment except when they are taken out to customers.
The trade is not hard to find. Outside Istanbul's general house, a collection of tiny brothels in a warren of alleys behind a guarded metal gate, touts accost visitors with whispered promises of beautiful young Russian girls at not much more than the price of the older Turkish women waiting for customers inside.
"I can bring you any kind of girl you want," promised an eager man in a black shirt and pants with a gold-faced watch, saying that his girls were kept in a building in the city center.
Part of the reason Turkey has become a magnet is that the more lucrative markets of Western Europe are protected by increasingly strict visa requirements that take weeks to work through, with only uncertain results. A young woman from Moldova can be in Istanbul in a day by paying just $10 for a monthlong visa at the border.
Turkey is also becoming a staging area for illegal migration elsewhere. "This is one of the reasons why the EU is so worried about Turkey," said Freedman, referring to European resistance to Turkey's quest to join the bloc. "It's increasingly a migrant hub."
Turkey has been working over the past two years to stop the trafficking and get off the U.S. government's blacklist. In 2003, the State Department listed Turkey in its report on trafficking as a "Tier 3" country, meaning that it had taken no significant action to eliminate the trade. The status jeopardized American financial aid to Turkey and helped spur it to act.
On the State Department's most recent report, issued this month, Turkey was moved up to "Tier 2," which means it is making significant efforts but still falls short of U.S. government expectations.
Turkey lists trafficking as a separate crime in its new penal code, which took effect this month. A one-year, $600,000 U.S. grant is being used to train police officers to recognize trafficked women among the unlicensed prostitutes they arrest.
The money is also paying for a hot line to help women caught in a trafficker's grip. A campaign to publicize the phone number includes billboards in the country's international airports and inserts that immigration officers slip into the passports of women arriving at Turkish border crossings.
Freedman said the hot line led to the rescue of a Moldovan woman in Antalya, a southern city, within days of its inauguration this month. Her captor was arrested.
Turkey's Interior Ministry has also enlisted nongovernmental organizations to provide support for women identified as victims.
Because of that support, Turkey's independent Human Resources Development Fund opened the country's only shelter for trafficked women last October in central Istanbul. But the shelter, which has helped 74 women, holds only 12 people.
"That's nothing when compared with the number of victims," said Berna Eren, president of the organization. More than 200 trafficked women were identified in Turkey last year but the authorities said they represented as little as 10 percent of the women bought and sold during that time.
Most of the women Eren's organization has seen are from Ukraine and Moldova, but the group has also helped women from Russia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Georgia and Iran.
"Some girls in the shelter say they have been sold more than once," she said, but added that as the women are sold "from city to city, the traffickers are hard to trace."
Every victim identified by the police is interviewed by a psychologist and referred to a psychiatrist if needed. Eren said that women living in the shelter were kept under constant watch by a counselor and, when eventually repatriated, were met by a protective authority in their home country in an effort to keep them from falling back into the hands of traffickers.
"In the past they were simply deported as a prostitute and would arrive in their home countries with no money," Eren said. "Traffickers would pick them up, get them new passports and send them back."
Sebnem Arsu contributed reporting from Istanbul for this article.
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